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ABSTRACT. The act of ‘setting the law’ enjoys a central position in Kelsen’s
theory of authority. His analysis of this act criticizes, amongst others, the assump-
tion of natural-law doctrines that norms are objective when they duplicate a
content given directly to cognition and independently of the act whereby the norm
is enacted. Correctly, Kelsen attacks the concept of representation underlying
this assumption as an example of metaphysical dualism and a copy theory of
knowledge. Does, then, an alternative understanding of authority require scrap-
ping representation from a theory of positive law? Or does it require interpreting
representation differently? Following the second path, this paper reconstructs the
act of setting the law in terms of the critical concept of representation developed
by Ernst Cassirer and suggests how, thus reconstructed, the structure of this act
can account for the law’s authority and its contingency.
INTRODUCTION
The term ‘authority’ is commonly used in one of two ways in the
law, namely when referring to individuals empowered by the legal
order – legal authorities – or to the law’s objectivity – the authority
of the law. Although apparently disparate, these two meanings of
authority are intimately connected, a connection that Kelsen high-
lights by insisting that all law is valid as posited law. Drawing
attention to the act of positing the law suggests, on the one hand,
that understanding what legal authority is requires analyzing what
it does. For what legal authorities do is to posit, set, the law. On
the other hand, setting the law sheds light on the authority of law:
validity is a quality accruing to the law as posited law. In a word,
positing the law yields the key to the act of legal objectivation.
Kelsen correctly recognizes that legal objectivation is an act of
law application and law creation. But by arguing that application
concerns the higher-level norm and creation the lower-level norm,
the Pure Theory of Law inadvertently repeats the metaphysical and
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epistemological presuppositions of the doctrines of natural law it
aimed to overcome. This paper argues that moving beyond natural-
law doctrines requires recognizing that law-setting is a dialectical
act: positing a norm transforms, to a lesser or greater extent, the
applied norm. Radicalizing Kelsen’s insight into the twofold char-
acter of legal objectivation demands understanding that setting
the law at once applies and creates, represents and presents, the
higher-level norm.
This idea will be developed in three steps. Section 1 examines
the opposition between natural-law doctrines and the Pure Theory,
suggesting that Kelsen’s analysis of law-setting does not resolve
the problem of representation inherited from natural-law doctrines.
Section 2 reconstructs the act of positing the law in the framework of
a critical concept of representation, arguing that this act is dynamic
in a far more radical sense than that envisaged by Kelsen. Finally,
section 3 explores in what way the dynamic – dialectical – char-
acter of law-setting can address the central problem confronting the
concept of authority in a theory of positive law: given the contin-
gency of the law, how can we meaningfully distinguish between
objectivity and subjectivity?
1. SETTING THE LAW AS REPRODUCTION
Despite their differences, theories of natural law and the Pure
Theory of Law agree that legal objectivation is an act of norm
application. One might expect, therefore, that their polemic would
focus on the following question: What does it mean to apply a norm?
Natural-law doctrines do, indeed, address this question head-on:
to apply a norm is to represent its normative content. In a relent-
less critique of these doctrines, Kelsen shows that the concept of
representation they endorse is untenable. But instead of interpreting
application and representation in a new way, the Pure Theory of Law
shifts the terms of the polemic: What norm must be applied, such
that posited norms can be viewed as objective? As a result of this
changed set of problems, the Pure Theory falls short of providing a
viable alternative to the concept of legal objectivation endorsed by
natural-law doctrines.
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1.1 The ‘Faktum’ of the Law
Let us take our point of departure in what might be called theFaktum
of the law: legal norms do not ‘stand alone’; they stand in relation
to each other. This has nothing to do with the empirical fact that
any imaginable human society is too complex to be successfully
regulated by a single legal norm. The fact that legal norms do not
stand alone expresses a conceptual rather than an empirical truth. It
means that a single legal norm would simply not be a legal norm.
The relational character of legal norms constitutes these norms as
such.
What, then, is the nature of the relation between legal norms?
In what way, for example, is a tax inspector’s order for payment
related to an administrative regulation concerning income taxes,
and, in turn, the administrative regulation to an income-tax law?
One way of answering this question appeals toapplication. The
order for payment is an application of the administrative regu-
lation, and the regulation an application of the income-tax law.
From this perspective, the term ‘relation’ has an ontological and an
epistemological import. Ontologically, i.e. in terms of the mode of
existence of legal norms, conceiving of the relation between norms
as applicative means that a norm is given – exists – as instancing
another norm. Otherwise put, the objectivity of a legal norm, its
mode of existence, implies that it is ‘derived’ from, ‘grounded’
in, another norm. Epistemologically, i.e. in terms of the cognition
of legal norms, conceiving of the relation between these norms as
applicative means that we cognize a norm as particularizing another
normative content. To cognize a tax inspector’s order for payment,
for example, means that its content is held to apply a general
normative content, namely the apposite administrative regulation.
Let us carry the analysis a step further: relation as application
means that the normat handinstances a norm that isnotat hand. In
the example, the legal authority’s order for payment must be ‘backed
up’ by the regulation. The expression ‘backed up’ indicates, first,
that the order for payment is authorized by the regulation. It also
suggests that the regulation stays ‘in back of’ the order for payment.
This ‘staying in back of’ implies that the regulation is given only
indirectly, i.e. through the order for payment. Certainly, the admin-
istrative regulation can become the object of discussion (i.e. come to
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‘the fore’) in another context. But we are confronted with the same
phenomenon: as a legal norm, the regulation must be ‘backed up’
by yet another norm, the income-tax law enacted by the legislative.
‘Back’ and ‘fore’ are spatial metaphors of an elementary, but
crucially important feature of the law: that a legal norm does not
‘stand alone’ means, positively expressed, that its ands foranother
norm. Succinctly, relation as application implies that legal norms
possess a representational structure. Ontologically, a legal norm is
present – exists – as representing another norm; herein lies its claim
to objectivity or validity. Epistemologically, to cognize a norm is
to view its content as representing another normative content. We
see the regulation in the tax inspector’s order for payment, or the
income-tax law in the regulation, because legal norms exemplify the
general structure of representation: seeing the absent in the present.
This insight impinges on the view that the law is a hierarchical
order of norms; a norm is ‘lower’ because itrepresentsa ‘higher’
norm. The hierarchical relation between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ norms
is another way of expressing the idea that norms have a represen-
tational structure. In terms of content, the progression from lower
to higher norms takes us from the particular to the more general.
The tax inspector’s order for payment is particular with respect to
the administrative regulation, which is itself particular with respect
to the income-tax law. This law is also particular, namely with
respect to a certain value. For example, a redistributive income-tax
law represents a determinate conception of a just society, a flat-rate
income-tax law another. To be sure, political actors can contest the
generality of the values represented in legal norms, showing that
these norms embody a merely particular interest. The important
point, however, is that political opposition questions the represen-
tativity of posited norms, not the representational character of legal
norms as such. From this perspective, a constitution is the institu-
tional framework within which a ‘conflict of representations’ can
take place.
At the end of this paper I will return to this point and elaborate
on the problem of the generality of the values positivized in the
law and on the ‘conflict of representations.’ This problem, as we
shall see, is closely bound up with the question whether the relation
between legal norms is only applicative, as assumed hitherto. For
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the moment, however, let us concentrate on the legal representation
of values: What is the ontological and epistemological status of such
values? Do they exist independently of the legal norms that represent
them? Can they be known directly, i.e. without recourse to their legal
representations?
1.2 Natural-Law Doctrines
Natural-law theories come into the picture at this point. For they
answer, implicitly or explicitly, the question about the status of
the values represented by a legal order. Ontologically, natural-law
theories argue that such values enjoy an existence independent of
the order itself. Epistemologically, they assert that their normative
content can be known immediately, i.e. without the mediation of
the legal order and its norms. Enter Kelsen. One of his great merits
as a legal philosopher is to have unmasked the ontological and
epistemological presuppositions of natural-law doctrines.
These doctrines, as Kelsen realized, are not the product of any
especially gifted flight of the imagination. On the contrary, natural
law is the ‘natural’ attitude toward the law. This attitude is a vari-
ation on what might be called the naive, uncritical, explanation
of objectivity. This naive explanation rests, first, on metaphysical
dualism. In the domain of values, the domain apposite to the law,
this dualism manifests itself in the distinction between transcendent
values and empirical values.1 From the viewpoint of natural-law
doctrines, empirical values are not merely conditioned; they are
conditioned by values possessing a reality independent of the law.
This brings us to the second of the presuppositions of natural-
law doctrines, which Kelsen calls ‘the copy theory’ (Abbildtheorie)
of knowledge. These doctrines assume that the direct cognition of
values existing independently of all legal normativity enables their
legal positivization. In other words, natural-law doctrines conceive
of legal objectivity as beingpurely reproductive: a legal norm
‘stands for’ a higher-level norm because it copies an original, a
1 See Hans Kelsen, “Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism”, trans.
Wolfgang H. Kraus, as an appendix to Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law
and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (New York: Russel & Russel, 1945; hereafter:
NLD), pp. 389–446, p. 420.
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normative content given directly to cognition.2 By implication,
applying a higher-level norm means duplicating its content in
a lower-level norm. Hence, the given is first and foremost the
content of the value ‘in itself.’ Earlier, however, when discussing
the representational structure of legal norms, we saw that these
were given – present – as related to a higher norm, which was
only apprehended indirectly. But here, confronted with the ques-
tion concerning the epistemological status of the values represented
by legal norms, natural-law theories abandon entirely the domain
of law, assuming that these values can be cognizeddirectly, abso-
lutely. In other words, the values represented by the legal order are
viewed as given without the mediation of legal norms, as sheer pres-
ence. Notice the inversion that has taken place with regard to our
foregoing analysis concerning theFaktumof the law: natural-law
doctrines postulate thepriority of presence over representation.
This postulate has a direct bearing on the concept of objectivity.
By postulating the existence of transcendent values given directly
to cognition, such doctrines aim to provide a fixed ‘measure’ or
standard for judging the content of positive law. If the content
of positive law represents the content of such values, a positive
legal order is objective; if it does not, positive law is subjective. In
short, by postulating that the aforementioned values can be known
directly, natural-law doctrines aim to assure legal authorities of an
indubitable fulcrum for legal application. Crucially, the priority of
presence over representation is not limited to the values transcendent
to the law. Once these values have been grasped in all their imme-
diacy, natural-law doctrines assume that each of the acts of applying
legal norms unfolds the same logic: the norm enacted by a legal
authority is objective when it duplicates a normative content given
directly to cognition. Consequently, the postulate of values ‘in them-
selves’ is only theborderline caseof a more general presupposition,
namely that the ground of a legal norm, whether a higher-level legal
norm or the values positivized in the law, exists independently of the
norm and can be known directly.
As Kelsen correctly notes, the central problem confronting
natural-law doctrines is that the content of the ‘natural order,’ which
is supposed to function as the measure of the objectivity of positive
2 SeeNLD, p. 420.
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law, is itself the object of deep and ineradicable social conflict.
Although natural-law doctrines ascribe a ‘directly evident quality’
to the natural order,3 political reality ensures the swift demise of
this postulate, for every allegedly directly evident value can be, and
invariably is, countered by a competing value. As Kelsen puts it,
the representatives of natural law “have not proclaimedonenatural
law but severalvery different natural laws conflicting with each
other.”4 Accordingly, the conflict between natural-law doctrines
makes manifest precisely what they separately attempt to conceal,
namely that any and every legal order embodies aparticular set of
values. Against the ideological function of such doctrines, Kelsen
argues that a theory of legal objectivity and objectivation can only
be credible if it accommodates the contingency of the law.
1.3 A Double Ambiguity in the Pure Theory of Law
Having exposed the shortcomings of natural-law doctrines, Kelsen
seeks to account for objectivity and objectivation in the framework
of the Pure Theory as a theory of positive law. Yet, before turning to
examining the Pure Theory, we must understand the challenge it has
to meet. The foregoing analysis suggests that natural-law doctrines
are, first, aunified theory of norm application, for they correctly
recognize that the act of norm application has a single structure,
regardless of the level of generality of the norms applied by legal
authorities. Natural-law doctrines are, second, atheory of represen-
tation, as they rightly perceive that to apply a norm is to represent it.
Consequently, Kelsen must explain the role of norm application and
representation in the act of legal objectivation without falling prey to
the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of natural-law
doctrines. Does the Pure Theory meet this double challenge?
The key to overcoming natural-law doctrines is, in Kelsen’s view,
the theory of the basic norm and, connected to it, the analysis of
law-setting. We must turn, therefore, to these two contributions
3 Hans Kelsen,Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, 1st edn. ofReine
Rechtslehre, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992; hereafter:PTL1), p. 55.
4 Hans Kelsen,The Pure Theory of Law, 2nd edn. ofReine Rechtslehre,
trans. Max Knight (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970; hereafter:
PTL2), p. 220.
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to establish whether the Pure Theory acquits itself of the double
challenge posed by natural-law doctrines. The results, on closer
examination, are ambiguous.
Consider, first, Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm. Rather than
rehearsing this theory at any length, an enterprise that has inten-
sively occupied Kelsen scholarship, let us instead focus on the
aspect decisive to our inquiry, namely the view on authorization
germane to the basic norm. Kelsen notes that a norm can authorize
the organ entitled to enact a norm, the procedure for its enactment, or
the content of the enacted norm. While the third of these – material
authorization – plays an important role in validity, he contends
that it does not function as the ultimate criterion of validity. At a
minimum, a norm must determine theorgan authorized to posit
norms. Conversely, this minimum is sufficient to speak of norm
application and, consequently, of valid norms. “[L]aw creation must
be understood as law application, even if the higher norm deter-
mines only the personal element, the individual, who has to render
the law-creating function.”5 Accordingly, the Pure Theory views the
ground of a legal order as doing no more than conferring normative
power on an organ. “[T]he basic norm is limited to authorize a norm-
creating authority, it is a rule according to which the norms of this
system ought to be created.”6
The upshot of this threefold distinction is that, from the point of
view of legal science, the objectivity of the law does not depend
on the alleged generality of the values applied in the enactment of
general legal norms. The basic norm ‘brackets’ these values in the
sphere of legal science, relegating their application to the domain of
legal politics. Kelsen’s move, though bold, is inconclusive. Even if
one grants for the sake of argument that the objectivity of a general
legal norm does not depend on its representing a value, once a value
has been positivized in a general legal norm, this norm’s content
conditions the objectivity of the individual norms that represent
it. By then, the Trojan horse of representation has been wheeled
into positive law. For what is the ontological and epistemological
status of the general norm with respect to the individual norms that
5 PTL2, p. 235.
6 PTL2, p. 197.
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represent it?7 Metaphysical dualism and the copy theory of law are
not restricted to the application of a ‘metajuridical’ value; precisely
because the ‘natural’ attitude towards the law, they can also be the
presuppositions of what it means to say that a norm of positive law is
the application of a higher-level legal norm. Hence, the basic norm
only postpones, without resolving, the problem of representation.
Rather than addressing the question, ‘What is norm application?’,
the basic norm responds to the following query: ‘What norm, when
applied, lends a legal order objectivity?’
This reductive strategy has a second weakness. Assuming there
is a concept of norm application that could overcome metaphysical
dualism and the copy theory of knowledge in the process of applying
general legal norms, would it not holda fortiori for the process
of applying values? A solution to the problem of the application
of normative contents must be general; if such, this solution also
encompasses the application of values. Here, then, is the rub: the
contrast between natural-law doctrines and a theory of positive law
is not the contrast between two competing conceptions of the basic
norm, but between two competing conceptions of norm application
and representation. From this perspective, the ground of the legal
order has no epistemological or ontological priority for a theory
of positive law; it is only a borderline case of a more general
problem, namely the representational structure of legal norms. By
focusing on the basic norm, Kelsen conceals the general problem of
representation and, concealing it, leaves it unresolved.
Consider Kelsen’s second main contribution to a theory of
positive law, the analysis of the act of setting the law. In a one-
liner that could well count as the manifesto of legal positivism, he
states: “The law is valid only as positive law, that is, only as law
that has been issued or set.”8 Kelsen convincingly argues that the
act of setting a norm possesses a general structure, effectual in the
enactment of statutes and administrative regulations as much as in
7 This problem also holds for what Kelsen calls ‘formal’ authorization. In
effect, the basic question is not what distinguishes ‘formal’ from ‘material’
authorization, but what authorization is as such, i.e. what it means toapply a
norm. While the distinction between formal and material authorization is certainly
apposite from a legal point of view, it is irrelevant from an epistemological and
ontological perspective.
8 PTL1, p. 56.
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legal custom, in adjudication no less than in contracts. This tenet
clears the way for viewing the act of positing the law as the core
of legal objectivation in a theory ofpositivelaw. Yet how far does
Kelsen’s analysis of the law-setting go in meeting the challenge of
natural-law doctrines?
His central insight is well known: “[L]egal acts are acts of both
law creation and law application. With each of these legal acts, a
higher-level norm is applied and a lower-level norm is created.”9
The distinction between norm creation and application is decisive,
as we shall later see, for developing a concept of objectivation
capable of overcoming natural-law doctrines. In effect, Kelsen can
be construed as saying that while application is a necessary condi-
tion of legal objectivity, it is not a sufficient condition thereof; norm
creation is also a condition of objectivity. But in what way?
Closer analysis suggests that in the same stroke by which Kelsen
opens the way toward an alternative to natural-law doctrines, he also
conceals it. For the terms in which the Pure Theory construes the
distinction between law application and law creation are entirely
congenial to natural-law doctrines. Indeed, if the legal actproduces
a lower-level norm, does it not by the same tokenr producethe
higher-level norm? To be sure, in his theory of interpretation Kelsen
views legal norms as providing only a ‘frame’ of normative possi-
bilities, such that legal authorities enjoy discretion in applying any
one of these possibilities.10 Clearly, however, the recourse to the
metaphor of a ‘frame’ does not do away with a purely reproductive
concept of norm application; it merely relaxes, without dissolving,
the strictures imposed by natural-law doctrines. In effect, this meta-
phor functions in the Pure Theory in the same way as does the
‘measure’ of law in natural-law doctrines. Not only must the posited
norm ‘fit’ within the frame to be objective, but the objectivity of the
posited norm is also guaranteed by the fact that the frame exists
independently of its applications.11 By equating reproduction to the
9 PTL1, p. 70. Kelsen excludes two borderline cases from this correlation,
namely the presupposition of the basic norm that, by definition, does not apply
a higher norm and the act of applying a sanction, which does not create a new
norm.
10 See, among others,PTL1, §36, andPTL2, §45(d).
11 Kelsen’s reference to the ‘constitutive’ character of adjudication does not
parry this objection either. Adjudication is ‘constitutive’ merely in the legal sense
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application of a higher-level norm, and production to the creation of
a lower-level norm, Kelsen inadvertently brings on board the very
concept of representation he was concerned to jettison from legal
positivism.
What explains Kelsen’s reticence to abandon the reproductive
character of norm application, a reticence that stands in sharp
contrast to his theoretical boldness concerning the basic norm?
The answer, I submit, is an elemental feature of legal objectivity
that natural-law doctrines are keenly aware of, namely that without
reproduction there is no norm application, and without norm
application it makes no sense to speak of the norm posited by a
legal authority as being objective. In effect, a purely productive
act of law-setting would be entirely subjective. Yet if purely repro-
ductive, as required by metaphysical dualism and the copy theory
of knowledge, law-setting is tantamount to another form of subjec-
tivism, namely the legal perpetuation of a particular set of values.
In both cases, a theory of positive law that could respect the contin-
gency of law without effacing the difference between objectivity and
subjectivity remains beyond our grasp.
At this junction, I propose to disjoin what the Pure Theory treats
as inseparable, namely the theory of the basic norm and an inquiry
into the act of setting the law. However fascinating and audacious,
Kelsen’s basic norm simply does not do the trick in meeting the
principled challenge posed by natural-law doctrines. In contrast,
Kelsen’s insight that the act of positing the law has a single struc-
ture not only moves on the same plane of generality as that of
natural-law doctrines, but, by arguing that validity accrues to norms
as posited norms, it also holds promise of an alternative concept
of legal objectivation. In particular, the task at hand consists in
radicalizing Kelsen’s intuition concerning the twofold character of
law-setting. Whereas Kelsen views reproduction and production as
pertaining to twodifferentnorms, the higher- and lower-level norms,
respectively, could the act of positing a norm reproduce and produce
thesamenorm, namely theappliednorm?
that the judge must determine whether the general legal norm is constitutional,
not in any epistemologically strong sense (seePTL2, §35[g.α]). Moreover, if the
term ‘constitutive’ is used in an epistemologically strong sense, thenall acts of
legal objectivation, not merely adjudication, would be constitutive.
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2. SETTING THE LAW AS TRANSFORMATION
To answer this question we must consider afresh the concept of
representation. For this concept forfeits its epistemological and
ontological significance at the hands of the Pure Theory. More
concretely, I will sketch out the main lines of a concept of repre-
sentation that draws on Kant’s critical philosophy and, especially,
on Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. Both, of course,
are household names to Kelsen. On one interpretation, patronized
by Kelsen himself, the basic norm is inspired in Cohen’s recep-
tion of Kant’s philosophical project. Early on, Kelsen also refers to
Cassirer’s distinction between ‘substance’ and ‘function’ as fruitful
for a legal theory of the state.12 But in a later letter to Renato
Treves, Kelsen adds a telling remark: “[T]he Pure Theory of Law
. . . resolved this concept [of the person] in the spirit of Kantian
philosophy, where all substance is reduced to function. Cassirer,
one of the best of the Kantians – while he was a Kantian – has
shown this in his fine book.”13 By implication, Cassirer’s later work
relinquished the aforementioned distinction and no longer deserved
the ‘quality predicate’ of Kantian philosophy. I will not engage
in the sterile debate about whether or not Cassirer was a neo-
Kantian. It suffices, for my purposes, that Cassirer’s early book links
the distinction between substance and function to two competing
concepts of representation, and that a chief endeavor of the three-
volumePhilosophy of Symbolic Formsconsists in elucidating and
applying a critical concept of representation to diverse fields of
human activity.14 Significantly, however, Cassirer did not investigate
12 See Hans Kelsen,Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kri-
tische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht(Aalen: Scientia
Verlag, 1981), p. 212.
13 Hans Kelsen, “The Pure Theory of Law, ‘Labandism’, and Neo-Kantianism:
A Letter to Renato Treves”, trans. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson, in Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds.),Norma-
tivity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes(Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1998), pp. 169–175, p. 174.
14 For Cassirer’s early reference to representation, see hisSub tance and Func-
tion and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, trans. William C. Swabey and Marie C.
Swabey (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1923), p. 280ff. See
also the Foreword to volume 1 of Cassirer’sThe Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,
trans. Ralf Mannheim (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955–57), pp. 69–
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positive law in terms of the representational structure of legal norms.
Accordingly, Kelsen and Cassirer can engage in mutual collabora-
tion, albeit in a way unsuspected by both philosophers. Whereas
Cassirer leads the way in reconsidering the representational char-
acter of law-setting, an analysis of this act, as required by Kelsen,
opens up positive law to Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms.
2.1 The Copernican Turn of Representation
It is no mean irony that precisely the fundamental tenet of Kant’s
critical philosophy provides the strongest possible argument for
reexamining the concept of representation. Consider the following
passage from an important text of what Paulson calls the neo-
Kantian period of Kelsen’s classical phase:
While positivism denies to itself any natural law speculation, that is to say, any
attempt to recognize a ‘law in itself’ [Recht an sich], it confines itself to a theory
of positive law. Thus positive law is taken solely as a human product, and a natural
order inaccessible to human cognition is in no wise considered as necessary for
its justification.15
By dismissing out of hand the attempt to cognize a ‘law in itself,’
Kelsen evokes, of course, Kant’s thesis that the ‘thing in itself’
is unknowable. Yet far from banishing representation from critical
philosophy, Kant’s thesis radicalizes this concept. In effect, rejecting
the possibility of cognizing theDing an sich is another way of
saying that objectivity has a strictly representational structure. The
real – presence – is only intelligible for human beings when it
stands for something else, a ‘form.’ Human beings cannot apprehend
the sheer presence of an absolute reality because sheer presence is
unintelligibility slechthin.Declining a copy theory of knowledge,
‘dogmatism’ as Kant calls it, requires recognizing that the human
cognition of reality is representational through and through. Thus,
the critical turn in philosophy implies that, for cognition, there isno
presence without representation.
If Kant’s Critique of Pure Reasonexplores this tenet in the
framework of an inquiry into the scientific cognition of natural
72, p. 69, where Cassirer remarks that this three-volume work generalizes the
approach first developed inSubstance and Function.
15 NLD, p. 435.
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reality, Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms expands and casts
it into a general theory of the conditions of objectivity. Like science,
Cassirer argues, activities so disparate as myth, language, religion,
technology, and art are all ways of rendering reality intelligible,
of objectifying it, of transforming ‘chaos into order.’16 He under-
scores the relational character of objectivity, noting that to objectify
reality is to go beyond or surpass the particular – ‘matter’ –, relating
it to the general – ‘form.’ Cassirer also explains the formal or
general moment of objectivity by suggesting that the objectifying
act requires a ‘point of view’ whence the real can be differenti-
ated and, being differentiated, understood. The concept ‘book,’ for
example, allows us to look for and pick out certain things as books,
that is, as things that instance – represent – this concept. Represen-
tation conditions the absoluteness of reality, for, when made to stand
for a form, the real manifests itself as grounded, as objective. In this
radical sense of the term, representation is aconditio humana.
Accordingly, the Copernican turn of representation marks the
demise of metaphysical dualism and a copy theory of knowledge.
Chapter 6 of Cassirer’sSubstance and Function, significantly titled
‘The Concept of Reality,’ opens with the following sentence: “[T]he
characteristic procedure of metaphysics [consists]. . . in separating
correlative standpoints within the field of knowledge itself, and
thus transforming what is logically correlative into an opposition
of things.”17 It is no coincidence that this is the chapter in which
Cassirer distinguishes two concepts of representation, one that
separates presence and representation, and another that views these
as a unity. Overcoming metaphysics and a copy theory of knowledge
in the legal domain requires understanding that, although we can
distinguish between presence and representation, matter and form,
this distinction abstracts from their more original unity. Critical
philosophy ismonistic, for it postulates the priority of the relation
between presence and representation. This insight contributes to a
philosophical justification of what I earlier called theFaktumof the
law. That legal norms do not stand ‘alone’ has nothing to do with a
16 Ernst Cassirer, “Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum”, in Ernst
Cassirer,Symbol, Technik, Sprache(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985),
pp. 93–111, p. 101.
17 Cassirer,Substance and Function( . 14 above), p. 271.
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special feature of such norms, or even of norms in general, but with
the fact that representation is a condition of objectivity.
In this context, Cassirer’s analysis of representation casts
Kelsen’s concept of validity in a new light. In Kelsen’s words, “to
speak . . . of the ‘validity’ of a norm is to express first of all simply
the specific existence of the norm, the particular way in which the
norm is given . . . ”18 Because a legal norm is given as posited, as the
application of a higher-level norm, Kelsen’s definition of validity
effectively asserts that representation is the manner of ‘givenness’
or existence proper to legal norms. A posited norm objectifies a
state of affairs that requires legal ordering – ‘matter’ – by relating
it to a higher-level norm – a ‘form.’ Hence, the norm posited by a
legal authority exemplifies what Cassirer termed a “concrete unity
of presence and representation.”19 Here is the legal manifestation of
what Kant called an ‘object,’ and Cassirer a ‘symbol.’ In Cassirer’s
terminology, the distinction between the applied norm and its appli-
cations is not adistinctio in re, as assumed by a copy theory of
knowledge, but adistinctio rationis.20
Finally, a critically informed concept of representation suggests
the need to negotiate a ‘middle way’ between natural-law doctrines
and the Pure Theory. The former reify the values embodied in
a legal order by granting them a transcendent status. The latter’s
‘formal, dynamic’ basic norm counters this hypostasis by severing
the objectivity of positive law from the representation of values.
Notice that a deeper communion joins these two strategies: both
separate a unitary structure – the legal representation of values – into
its two independent terms. In terms of the definition of metaphysics
outlined inSubstance and Function, the appeal to the basic norm
turns out to be every bit as metaphysical as natural-law doctrines. A
critical theory of law inspired in Cassirer’s analysis of representa-
tion steers clear of both manifestations of this single metaphysical
18 PTL1, p. 12.
19 Ernst Cassirer,The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3 (n. 14 above),
p. 129.
20 Ibid. Cassirer thereby generalized and radicalized Kant’s famous dictum
about the structure of appearance, namely that “thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Immanuel Kant,Critique of Pure
Reason, trans. Norman K. Smith [Hong Kong: Macmillan Education, 1987], A51,
B75).
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strategy. Against the hypostasis of values into a ‘natural order’ inde-
pendent of the legal order, a critical theory of law is a theory of
positive law. Against the Pure Theory, it argues that the representa-
tional structure of legal norms determines the positivity of the law. A
legal norm is always a posited norm, and as such, a representation of
a higher-level norm and, ultimately, of values held to be constitutive
for a legal order.
But if every legal norm represents values, and every value
is particular, does not this proposed ‘middle way’ boil down to
rendering such valuesabsolute? Even if one grants that the repre-
sentation of values is a condition for the objectivity of legal norms,
how can we avoid the danger discussed earlier, namely the legal
perpetuation of a particular set of values? These questions are vari-
ations on the overriding problem of a theory of positive law, namely
accounting for the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity
in a way that recognizes the irreducible contingency of the law.
To address this problem, a shift of perspective is required. Instead
of discussing further the unity of presence and representation as
constitutive of objectivity, let us now examine the process of
objectivation: What determines positing the law as anact?
2.2 The Dynamics of Objectivation
The Pure Theory views the law as dynamic because it is a process of
self-creation. The law creates itself in the ongoing process whereby
general norms are rendered increasingly concrete, individual. But
if, as we have seen, Kelsen’s interpretation of the reproductive and
productive character of the legal act is congenial to the presupposi-
tions of natural-law doctrines, does it justify speaking about ‘legal
dynamics’ in astrongsense? The distinction between ‘statics’ and
‘dynamics’ only takes on a strong sense if it refers to two competing
conceptions of the act of setting the law. A static conception views
this act as merely reproducing the norm it applies, whether or not
the posited norm ‘completes’ the applied norm by adding individu-
alizing features to it. By this criterion, the Pure Theory espouses a
static interpretation of positing the law. What, then, is a dynamic
conception of this act?
The key to this question lies in the ‘re’ of representation. If we
reject the idea that this prefix means the duplication of an original,
AUTHORITY AND REPRESENTATION 239
then to represent means literally to presentagain. On this reading,
representation is aprocess,namely a context-bound iteration. Two
cardinal implications flow from this insight. First, presenting ‘again’
means that each objectifying act links up toforegoing representa-
tions, not to an original. The series of acts whereby a ‘form’ is
presented time and again does not take its point of departure in
a pure presence. There is no ‘original’ of, for instance, a book;
what we have is a sequence of human actions that treat things
as books. Second, the same form is rendered present in different
things: this book, that one, etc. Repetition introduces adiffer-
ence,however minimal, with respect to earlier representations. As
Bernhard Waldenfels puts it, “Repetition is the return of what is
different as the same.”21
The ‘difference’ introduced by repetition is of the utmost impor-
tance for understanding the dynamics of objectivation. In effect,
reality is only intelligible when differentiated, and this implies that
every ordering or objectifying principle includes some aspects of
the real as relevant and excludes others as irrelevant. In Cassirer’s
words, the chief task of an order is to “limit the unlimited, to
determine the relatively indeterminate.”22 What a form excludes
as irrelevant does not, however, simply disappear; it remains as
the latent meanings of the real – presence – that can become
relevant in another context. Although there is no presence without
representation, presence is alwaysmore than what it represents.
Presence retains a ‘surplus’ of possible meanings with respect to the
meaning projected by the form. Consequently, no ordering principle
succeeds in establishing itself definitively; the closure of the real
anticipated by a form is never conclusive because what it shuts out
retains a disruptive potential with respect to the form itself. From
this perspective, the objectifying act is predominantlyreproductive
when what requires ordering ‘fits’ by and large into the ‘measure’
we call a form. In such cases, the ordering principle remains rela-
tively unproblematic in the ongoing process of objectifying reality.
Contrariwise, objectivation isproductivewhen the real manifests
21 Bernhard Waldenfels,Ordnung im Zwielicht(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981),
p. 64 (my translation).
22 Cassirer, “Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum” (n. 16 above),
p. 100.
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itself as disruptive or ‘unruly,’ when it challenges the relevance
criteria – the ‘measure’ – projected by the ordering principle. In such
cases, a new form is created in the process of objectifying reality.
Bear in mind, however, that the act of objectifying reality is
neither purely reproductive nor purely productive of a form. In
effect, both extremes presuppose the idea of an ‘original.’ A purely
reproductive understanding of objectivation is, as we have seen, the
implication of metaphysical dualism and the copy theory of knowl-
edge. The second extreme, objectivation as a purely productive act,
would dissolve the distinction between the ground and the grounded,
between form and matter; it would be thecreatio ex nihiloof –
literally – an original that, in its sheer originality, would be unintel-
ligible. Moreover, and no less importantly, the distinction between
both types of objectivation isgradual rather than disjunctive. We
speak of objectivation as being predominantly reproductive when
the continuation of a form prevails over its creation, or as being
predominantly productive when the creation of a form prevails over
its continuation.
Being both reproductive and productive, the act of objectiva-
tion is transformative.23 The term ‘transformation’ indicates that
objectivation modifies a form. Hence, objectivation is adi lectical
act: objectifying the real also modifies the principle of objectivation.
This insight casts the entire discussion on representation in a new
light. In effect, the act of objectifying reality is both representational
and presentational. The continuation of form, its representation, is
also, to a lesser or greater extent, the creation of form, its presenta-
tion. Giving Waldenfels’s expression a new twist, objectivation, by
reformulating the criteria of inclusion and exclusion anticipated in
a form, also enables the return of what is the same as different.
Accordingly, objectivation is dynamic because it unfolds adialectic
of representation and presentation.
I submit that positive law is dynamic in the sense described
hitherto, i.e. that the act of positing the law unfolds a dialectic of
representation and presentation. As noted in subsection 2.1, setting
23 See Waldenfels,Ordnung im Zwielicht(n. 21 above), pp. 144–146, and
his article “Der Logos der praktischen Welt”, in Bernhard Waldenfels,Der
Stachel des Fremden(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 83–102, for the distinction
between production and reproduction.
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a legal norm objectifies a state of affairs that requires legal ordering
– ‘matter’ – by applying a higher-level norm – a ‘form.’ This bare-
bones description of the representational character of law-setting
can now be fleshed out more fully. In effect, the higher-level norm
includes some values and excludes others. Succinctly, setting the
law (Rechtssetzung) is an instance of what Cassirer calls setting
limits (Grenzsetzung).24 Precisely because legal objectivation is
only possible by means of a normative reduction, the values margin-
alized by the legal order – the ‘illegal’ in a broad sense – never
lose the potential of disrupting this order. The ‘measure’ of the real,
as anticipated by a higher-level norm, never exhausts the possible
normative meanings of the real. Returning to the comments at the
end of subsection 1.1, the ‘conflict of representations’ does not take
place despite representation, butecauseof it. Indeed, the not-yet-
legally-ordered – ‘matter’ – can manifest itself in one of two ways in
the act of objectivation. At one end, we find the merely ‘disordered,’
which does not seriously contest the normative boundaries drawn
by the applicable norm. At the other, we find the ‘subversive,’ in
the broad sense of what disputes (explicitly or implicitly) the values
protected by the applicable norm. The (gradual) distinction between
these two modes of the not-yet-legally-ordered has its parallel in
the act of setting the law, which is either predominantly repro-
ductive or predominantly productive. Let me illustrate these ideas
by successively considering legal adjudication and legislation.
Legal dogmatics distinguishes between standard cases, in which
a legal court maintains a certain interpretation of a legal norm, and
landmark cases, wherein legal courts create a rule. Whereas in the
former the applicability of the legal norm is not seriously ques-
tioned, in the latter the state of affairs that calls for legal ordering
renders the applicable legal norm problematic, leading the court to
a new interpretation of this norm. The distinction between these two
cases is not, however, absolute. On the one hand, every standard
case requires at least a minimal reformulation of the general legal
norm, given the changed context in which this norm must be applied
(again). By implication, the change of direction laid down by a land-
mark case begins earlier, in the minor adjustments to the general
24 PTL1, p. 56; Cassirer, “Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum” (n.
16 above), p. 100.
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norm introduced in standard cases. On the other hand, a landmark
case does not produce an entirely novel rule; the landmark case
reformulates a legal norm, it applies a norm in a new way. For unless
the norm it posits can be viewed as the application of a higher-level
norm, the act of adjudication can raise no claim to objectivity. Thus,
viewing the opposition between standard case and landmark case as
rigid and unbridgeable boils down to viewing adjudication as being
either purely reproductive or purely productive.
If it is tempting to overlook the productive aspect of law-
setting in adjudication, the opposite temptation holds for legislation,
namely forgetting its reproductive character. For by positing general
norms, whether substantive or procedural, every legislative act also
claims to carry forward values claimed to be constitutive for the
identity of the community. Without this claim, legislation would
forfeit its objectivity. To be sure, the ongoing debate about the
meaning of such values, and how they should be given legal shape,
is the very stuff of politics. But this simply indicates that, in a
continuous confrontation with what requires legal ordering, the
enactment of statutes can run the entire gamut from legislative fine-
tuning to sweeping social reform. In both cases, the act of positing
the law involves both the reproduction and the production of values.
In short, although Kelsen is right in calling attention to the
productive and reproductive aspects of the legal act, the foregoing
considerations suggest that positive law is dynamic in a far more
radical way than he suggests. In effect, setting the law does not
merely produce a lower-level norm in applying a higher-level norm.
Law-setting is dynamic because this act partakes of thedialec-
tical character of objectivation in general: positing a norm always
transforms, to a lesser or greater extent, the applied norm. In other
words, setting the law is an act at once reproductive and productive,
representational and presentational.
3. A CONTROLLED TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW
The problem of legal objectivity is, conceptually speaking, the
‘measure’ of the law, that is, the problem of the generality of
the higher-level norms and, ultimately, of the values protected by
the legal order. By transporting such values into a transcendent
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sphere, natural-law doctrines attempt to grant them a universal
status. Against natural-law doctrines, the Pure Theory asserts that
the values applied in the enactment of (general) legal norms can be,
and invariably are, contested in the political arena. While general
with respect to its legal applications, no set of values can hope to
gain universal allegiance. Kelsen is surely right on this point. But if
he is, and if there is no legal objectivity without the representation
of values, how can we at all make sense of positive law as being
objective? Would we not have to accept that positive law, because
contingent, is irreducibly subjective?
Notice that qualifying positive law as subjective because it is
contingent implies that the ‘measure’ of objectivity is a set of values
that could command universal allegiance. In a word, if we construe
generality as meaning universality, then we can no longer distin-
guish contingency from arbitrariness. But need we equate generality
with universality, and contingency with arbitrariness?
The twofold character of legal objectivation, as an act both
representational and presentational, contests the conflation of these
terms, suggesting the conditions under which positive law can be
both contingent and objective. Let us begin with contingency. As
we have seen, the act of setting the law differentiates reality by
reproducing an ordering principle that includes certain values and
excludes others. The distinction between the values included and
excluded by the law is already ‘there’ before we can even begin
to question the distinction. Without the normative closure of the real
anticipated by a legal norm no legal objectivation would be possible.
Hence, objectivation – the rational actpar excellence– always
comes too late; it is made possible by the residue ofarationality
we call the contingency of the law. But if law begins as contin-
gent in the act of legal objectivation, need itend as contingent?
Does not the productive character of setting the law bear hope of
a universally acceptable legal order, an order that could trade in its
contingency for necessity? This, of course, is the conception of prac-
tical rationality in a Kantian vein, to which Kelsen was vehemently
opposed. The foregoing analysis suggests that if legal objectivation
comes too late in terms of the law’s contingency, it also always
comes too soon with respect to universality. In effect, the dialectical
character of setting the law implies that the production of norms
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and values also involves their reproduction. There is no ‘disem-
bodied’ perspective, no ‘neutral’ point of view, whence it would be
possible to discuss and establish which values deserve legal protec-
tion. Although objectivity cannot be conflated with the reproduction
of values, there is no objectivity without such reproduction. For, as
noted earlier, a purely productive act of setting the law reintroduces
the idea of an ‘original’ into objectivity. Contingency is here to stay:
the loss of an ‘original’ order represented in positive law also means
the forfeiture of an ‘original’ order that could be merely presented
by bracketing positive law.
If positive law is irreducibly contingent, need we also conclude
that it is irredeemably subjective? As shown in section 2, legal
objectivation is a dialectical act: positing a norm transforms, to a
greater or lesser extent, the applied norm and, ultimately, the values
positivized in the law, i.e. theform of law. Every legal norm antici-
pates a general way of dealing with situations, but this claim to
generality goes together with the proviso ‘until further notice.’ That
a state of affairs calling for legal objectivation does not signifi-
cantly question the applicable norm simply means that the norm’s
generality remains by and large uncontested in the act of legal
objectivation. Yet, as noted, the material ground of the law – the
not-yet-legally-ordered – can subvert the applicable legal norm or
value, exposing it as the expression of a particular interest. This
is the experience of subjectivity to which every legal norm and
value is continuously exposed. But this also means that, in such
cases, setting the law is also called on to reformulate the meaning
of the applicable legal norm, to search anew for a general criterion
of inclusion and exclusion. Legal objectivation ‘opens’ the law in
the same stroke by which it ‘closes’ the real. To put it in terms of
Kant’s famous distinction, the act of positing the law is never purely
‘determinative’; it is also more or less ‘reflective.’ Positing the law
not only ‘subsumes’ the particular under the general, but also has
to ‘find’ the general beginning from the particular.25 In its capacity
to transform the norm it applies, the act of positing the law can be
more than merely the perpetuation of a particular set of values.
25 Immanuel Kant,Critique of Judgment, rans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), Ak 179.
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This brings us back full circle to theFaktum of the law, as
outlined in subsection 1.1. In view of the question how we should
understand the relational character of norms, I noted at the outset of
this paper that, from the point of view of norm application, such
norms possess a representational structure. The analysis of legal
objectivation suggests that this interpretation of the relational char-
acter of norms is incomplete for at least two reasons. First, the act
of positing a norm creates the higher-level norm in the very act of
applying it. If the administrative regulation represents the income-
tax law, it is no less the case that the administrative regulation (and
the tax inspector’s order for payment) presents the income-tax law,
revealing its general meaning in the concrete context in which it
must be applied. Representation and presentation, norm applica-
tion and norm creation, are the two conditions of legal objectivity.
Second, legal objectivation demands that we view the hierarchy of
legal norms astwo-wayrather than one-way. For if a hierarchical
relation denotes a relation of dependency, then the applied norm is
both ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ than the posited norm. In effect, whereas
the posited norm depends on the applied norm to be objective, the
applied norm depends on the posited norm to reveal its general
meaning, a meaning that must be renewed time and again.
Accordingly, objectivity in the law cannot be explained in terms
of ‘either’ the reproduction of an applicable norm ‘or’ its produc-
tion, but rather as both. Kelsen is right in arguing that the conditions
of legal objectivity are the conditions of legal dynamics, if by
dynamics we understand the dialectics of setting the law. There is
no objectivity without the continuation of an ordering principle, yet
only the reformulation of this ordering principle, in confrontation
with what subverts the law, preserves a legal order from reifica-
tion and arbitrariness. It would seem, therefore, that in response to
what questions and contests the legal order from without, positing
the law is a controlled transgression of the law from within. This
act transgressesthe law because what does not fit into the law
can only be brought into the order by reformulating the normative
criteria consigned in the applicable norm. But positing the law is
also acontrolledtransgression of the law, for at stake in this act is
the continuation of order, not its abandonment. Recast in this way,
Kelsen’s remarkable insight, “the law is valid only as positive law,
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that is, only as law that has been issued or set,” can account for the
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity while respecting the
contingency of positive law.
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